RECENT CASES
strong as to shift the burden of persuasion 6 there ought to be some social policy to
justify this effect of the presumption.7 But the only ascertainable policy, if such it
may be called, seems to be the implicit dissatisfaction with the disproportionate contractual bargaining positions of the insured and the insurer. The usual policy is drawn
by the insurer's attorneys. It seems questionable whether, by the use of limited conditions, they should succeed in placing the burden of pleading and proof on the
beneficiaries.28 The question of "best common law" however, was foreclosed by
Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey.29 In that case the Supreme Court expressly approved
an instruction which was in substance that of the instant case.3o Surprisingly enough,
the majority here said that in the McConkey case no instruction was approved.
Labor Law-Anti-injunction Act-Right To Picket in Non-labor Dispute-[Federal].-The plaintiff operates a large number of retail grocery stores in the District of
Columbia, some of which are largely dependent on negro patronage. The defendant, a
corporation composed solely of colored persons not associated with any labor organization, is "organized for the mutual improvement of its members." The plaintiff refused
a request of the defendant to adopt a policy of employing colored help in certain of its
stores. The defendant thereafter began an organized peaceful patrol of the premises of
one of the plaintiff's stores and threatened a similar patrol of two others. The pickets
6

Travellers Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661 (z888); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown,
39 F. (2d) 376 (C.C.A. 5th 1930); Bachmeyer v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 87 Wis.
325, 58 N.W. 399 (1894); United Commercial Travellers v. Watkins, 38 Ohio App. 420, 176
N.E. 469 (193I); O'Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., io9 Kan. 138 197 Pac. 1oo
(1921); American Home Circle v. Schneider, 134 Ill. App. 6oo (,907); Withers v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 485, 193 Pac. 566 (1920); the "weight of authority," however,

appears to be contra: io3 A.L.R. i85.
27See Morgan, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9o9; but see Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon
the Presumption and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 8, (1933).
28Normally the burden of persuasion follows the burden of pleading. First National Bank
v. Ford, 3o Wyo. Io, 216 Pac. 69i (1923); Wigmore, op. cit. supranote 3, §2486. Other tests
often used place the burden of persuasion on the party having special knowledge (Wilson v.
Hodges, 2 East 312 (1802); 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 3, §2486), the "legal affirmative"
(Dickinson v. Evans, 6 T.R. 57 (1794)), or the "literal affirmative" of the issue (Berty v.
Dormer, 12 Mod. 526 (i7o)), but seem inapplicable here. The general contract rule that the
party desiring to come within a limited condition has the burden of pleading and proof on
that issue, 5 Wigmore op. cit. supranote 3, §§25o, 2537, is not illuminating. It maybe argued
that the condition was the double indemnity clause and the burden should be on the insured
to show the accident to come within the limited condition, or it is equally plausible to say that a
more limited condition was suicide and the burden is on the insurance company on that issue.
Though it is questionable whether the language of the insurance company's lawyers should
determine the placement of the burden of persuasion, it may be that because the beneficiary in
a double indemnity policy is trying to recover something extra that the burden of persuasion
should be on him. If the policy is in standard form prescribed by statute there seems even less
reason to favor the beneficiary.
29 127 U.S. 66i (1889).
30 "The defendant, in its answer, alleges that the death of the insured was caused by suicide.
The burden of proving this allegation by a preponderance of evidence rests on the defendant.
The presumption is that death is not voluntary .......
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carried placards stating: "Do Your Part! Buy Where You Can Work! No Negroes
Employed Here!" The plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the picketing. The
district court granted the injunction. The court of appeals,' in affirming the decree,
held that the case did not involve or grow out of a labor dispute within the meaning of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Supreme Court held (two justices dissenting), reversed. Even though the dispute is "racial," there exists a labor dispute within section
thirteen of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, thus prohibiting injunctive relief. New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.
The Court in the instant case by its broad interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act again illustrates the technique with which the judiciary interprets legislative enactments in order to reach the favored result.3 The Court felt that the strong social
justification for a limitation of injunctive relief against trade unions applies equally to
non-labor organizations, and that therefore under the act4 like treatment should be
accorded both groups. The definition of a labor dispute in section thirteen relied upon
by the court should be construed in conformity with section two. That section clearly
indicates that the statute was intended to aid labor in organizing and to obtain collectively increased wages, shorter hours, and a betterment of working conditions. It
is indeed questionable, therefore, whether the act should permit its application to this
dispute, in which the defendants do not seek a betterment of conditions of employment, but simply seek the employment on whatever terms it comes.5
Even though in the instant case the Court had found the controversy not a labor
dispute within the meaning of the act, the question whether an injunction should issue
would not have been foreclosed In those jurisdictions where peaceful picketing is
illegal if no strike is in progress,7 it would be difficult to justify picketing by a non-labor
group. Where, however, peaceful picketing in the absence of a strike has received
judicial sanction,8 it would seem that picketing by a group unassociated with orF. (2d) 5io (App. D.C. 1937).
258 S. Ct.
Cf. 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5r5, note 6 (1938).
447 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§roI-ri 5 (1937).
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(1938).
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s Beck Shoe Co. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (1934); Green v. Samuelson,
168 Md. 42r, 178 Atl. 109 (1935). In neither of these analagous cases was it urged by the
defendants that a labor dispute was involved.
6 An association of food stores picketed competitors for keeping their shops open at a time
when the association members remained closed; an injunction against peaceful picketing was
denied, although the court found no labor dispute within the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction
Act. Individual Retail Store Owners Ass'n v. Penn Treaty Food Stores Ass'n (Phila. C. P.
Ct. No. 6, Jan. 20, 1938), noted 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 556 (1938).
7 Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 19r, 115 N.E. 304 (3917); Gevas v. Greek Restaurant
Workers' Club, 99 N.J. Eq. 770, 134 Atl. 309 (1926); Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392,
187 Atl. 692 (1936); Smith Metropolitan Market Co., Ltd. v. Lyons, C.C.H. Labor Law
Service §18o26 (Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Co., Calif. 1937).
8 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921); two

of the plaintiff's employees were on strike, but in the absence of this factor it is hard to believe
that the court would have relied upon such a technical distinction to reach a different result.
It is also noteworthy that many of the men in the picket line were employees who had been
laid off and had not been recalled to work. Conceivably the court felt the men had a legal interest in their jobs, which may be a possible differentiation from the ordinary cases of picketing
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ganized labor is not unlawful where there exist considerations in favor of extending
such privileges that are equally as compelling as those existent in a labor dispute.9
The results have varied in the non-labor cases, 0 but where tenants picketed in an
effort to procure lower rents," it was felt that the social gain outweighed the commensurate loss inflicted on the landlord. Likewise an injunction was denied where an association of retail cleaners picketed a rival dealer to protest against the violation of an
N.I.R.A. code.12 The same method was stamped with approval when employed by a
theater owner against a scalper,13 and by consumers protesting against excessive
prices.'4 Just where the line must be drawn in denying injunctive relief in disputes of
this type is of necessity rather tenuous,s but it is apparent that each case must be
decided on its own facts in light of the advantage to be derived by the community
balanced against the injury befalling the complainant.
Although the courts have protected interests similar to that in the instant case,
there are considerations which may distinguish the racial dispute. There is a substan6
tial likelihood that race riots and reprisals might result from the prejudice incited.
in the absence of a strike. Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. IO7 (1917);
Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, IS7 N.E. 130 (1927); Stillwell Theatrev. Kaplan,
259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932), cerl. denied, 288 U.S. 6o6 (1932); Blumauer v. Portland
Union, 41 Ore. 399, 17 P. (2d) iix

5

(1933).

9See Barnes-Arno Bldg. Corp. v. Hoffman, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1933, p. 1324 (Sup. Ct. 1933)

(picketing by tenants in rent dispute upheld); Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' and Dyers'
Ass'n 31 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 433 (1934) (picketing of competitors to protest a reduction in
prices below those fixed by N.I.R.A. code).
10Allowing peaceful picketing: Barnes-Arno Bldg. Corp. v. Hoffman, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6,
1933, p. 1324 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Cohen v. Martin Beck, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 23, 1934 p. 1407 (Sup.,

Ct. 1934); Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' and Dyers' Ass'n, 31 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 433 (1934);
Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y. Supp. 250 (i934); Roseman v. United
Strictly Kosher Butchers, 163 Misc. 331, 298 N.Y. Supp. 343 (1937). See also Dutch Industries
Fair at Utrecht v. Dutch Committee against Terror and Persecution in Germany, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1933, p. 8 (Amsterdam Ct.). Not allowing peaceful picketing: Birnbaum v. Margosian, N.Y.L.J., March 6, 1933, at 1323 (Sup. Ct. 1933); People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187,
284 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1934) , aff'd., 266 N.Y. 565, 195 N.E. 202 (1935); Beck Shoe Corp. v.
Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (i934); Green v. Samuelson, i68 Md. 421, 178
Atl. 109 (1935).
11Barnes-Arno Bldg. Corp. v. Hoffman, N.Y.L.J. March 6, 1933, P. 1324 (Sup. Ct. '933).
2 Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' and Dyers' Ass'n 31 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 433 (1934)'3 Cohen v. Martin Beck, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1934, p. 1407 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
'4 Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y. Supp. 250 (1934). Unlike the
tenement dwellers, see note ii, supra, the consumers could readily have patronized another
bakery by way of protest.
SA factor meriting consideration is the possibility of subjecting the pickets to liability
under the usual theories of the right of privacy. See Brents v .Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W.
967 (1927). It would seem that the pickets should be forced to respond in damages where they
are using some personal item that is nobody else's business, for example, a group picketing the
plaintiff's store for the publicized reason that he failed to contribute to the community chest.
6 Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (1934); Green v. Samuelson, i68 Md. 421, 178 Atl. io9 (i935); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 92 F. (2d)

510 (App. D.C. 3937).
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On analogy to criminal libel17 it would seem ill-advised for a court to sanction a move8
ment of this type, which likewise tends to provoke retaliation,1 and to disturb the
9
peace.' A certain degree of violence, however, seems a necessary accompaniment to
any effort on the part of a previously subjected group to improve its conditions, as
many labor disputes will illustrate, and it has been suggested that "the alternative of
abandoning all attempts at progress is hardly preferable."2o It is particularly noteworthy that if the negroes organized as a labor union and demanded employment for
its members, there would dearly be a labor dispute within the meaning of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. 2 Thus the argument as to the likelihood of violence seemingly loses
its vigor.
In the present case, in contrast to the labor dispute, the interests of organized labor
will not be advanced and living standards will not be raised by a compliance with the
demands of the defendant. Because of this factor, there seems less justification for
applying the same liberal attitute now accorded labor.22 A solution, both providing for
the economic progress of the negro race and eliminating the possibility of racial conflict, would be a legislative prohibition23 against the exclusion of any person from union
membership becauseof race or color.

Torts-Slander Actionable per se-Extension of Scope of Business Slander[England] .- The plaintiff's employer, a diamond merchant, and most of the customers
of the business, were Jewish. The alleged words, spoken by the defendant to the plaintiff's employer, were, "Victor [the plaintiff] is a Jew-hater." No special damages were
proved. Held, that these words were actionable per se, as touching the plaintiff in
his employment. De Stemple v. Dunkels.'
The categories of slander actionable per se rest on arbitrary distinctions, which
have been strictly maintained by the courts.2 Although recovery for slander generally
'7 "The gist of the offense is its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace." Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law §170 (1934).
18 Where members of a labor union picketed a restaurant owner because he refused to discharge his colored employees after the union rejected an offer from the negroes seeking admission to the union. Willis v. Restaurant Employees, 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 435 (1927).
'9 It should be noted that while there is a broad social justification in the instant case, there
is no justification for criminally libelling another.
2o 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 383 (1935).

2"Lauf v. E. G. Skinner Co. 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938). But see Donnelly Garment Co. v.
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 21F. Supp. 807 (Mo. 1937), noted 5 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 514 (1938).
" Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, i57 N.E. I3O (1927); Stillwell Theatre v.
Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 782 N.E. 63 (1932), cer. denied, 288 U.S. 6o6 (1932); Goldfinger v.
Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, xi N.E. (2d) 910 (1937).
2 Many unions expressly exclude negroes from union membership. Spero and Harris, The
Black Worker 53 et seq. (1931). For a recent case refusing to compel a union to accept an
application for membership and stating that the problem is one for the legislature, see Miller
v. Ruehl, 2 N.Y. S. (2d) 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
xi58 L.T. ig (7938).
2 Gatley, Libel and Slander 40 (2d ed. 1924).

